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STRIKES OVER NON-ARBITRABLE
LABOR DISPUTES
NORMAN L. CANTOR *
In 1976, the Supreme Court significantly limited the availability of injunc-
tions against strikes by unions in ostensible breach of contractual no-strike
pledges. In the landmark decision, Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers,' the
Court held that section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 2 precluded an injunction
against a union's sympathy strike, allegedly in violation of a no-strike clause,
because the sympathy strike was not "over" an underlying arbitrable dispute.'
According to the Court, only where a union's strike evades the union's pledge
to arbitrate a dispute will an injunction be permissible under the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. 4 In rendering its decision, the Buffalo Forge Court reasoned that
t Copyright © 1982 by Boston College Law School.
* Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School, Newark, New Jersey; B.A., 1964 Princeton
University; ID., 1967, Columbia Law School. The research assistance of Paul Kenny is
gratefully acknowledged.
' 428 U.S. 397(1976).
2 29 U.S.C. 5 104 (1976); 5 428 U.S. at 411-13 (1976).
In Buffalo Forge, the employer sought an injunction under 5 301(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185(a) (1976), against a sympathy strike
undertaken by locals of the United Steelworkers of America representing production and
maintenance workers at three employer plants. 428 U.S. at 399-401. The sympathy strikers had
honored picket lines established by sister Steelworkers' locals representing office and clerical-
technical (0 & T) workers at the three locations. It at 400-01. The 0 & T picket lines were clear-
ly primary and lawful, as the picketing involved an economic dispute over the terms of a first con-
tract. Id. at 403. The sympathy strikers, however, arguably were violating a no-strike clause in
their contract. Kt at 405. The Court refused to allow an injunction against the alleged breach of
the no-strike clause, ruling that such no-strike injunctions were appropriate only where the strike
is over a specific issue which the union has agreed to resolve by arbitration. Id. at 411-12. In Buf-
falo Forge, the underlying dispute was an economic one between the employer and sister
Steelworkers' locals. Id. at 399-402. Thus the dispute clearly was not subject to arbitration.
428 U.S. at 408. See, e.g., J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Plumbers and Pipefitters Local
598, 568 F.2d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir. 1978); National Rejectors' Indus. v. United Steelworkers,
562 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978); Latrobe Steel Co. v. Local
1537, United Steelworkers, 545 F.2d 1336, 1340-42 (3d Cir. 1976). For discussions of Buffalo
Forge, see Ferguson & DiLorenzo, Forging a Strategy to Combat Sympathy Strikes, 29 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 817 (1978); Freed, Injunctions Against Sympathy Strikes: in Defense of Buffalo Forge, 54 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 289 (1979); Lowden & Flaherty, Sympathy Strikes, Arbitration Policy, and the Enforceability of
No-Strike Agreements — An Analysis of Buffalo Forge, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Lowden]; Shank, Boys Markets Injunctions: the Continuing Clash between Norris-
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a strike "over" an arbitrable grievance would frustrate the arbitration
process. 3
 If such strikes could not be enjoined, the underlying dispute likely
would be resolved through economic coercion rather than by an arbitrator's
determination. By contrast, in situations such as that in Buffalo Forge, where the
underlying dispute was not arbitrable, a sympathy strike would not frustrate
the arbitration process. The Court in Buffalo Forge reinforced its basic conclu-
sion by emphasizing that if preliminary judicial relief were readily available to
enforce contractual pledges, the respective roles of courts and arbitrators would
be confused and arbitrators' functions eroded. 6
The Buffalo Forge decision had broad implications. Its result suggested that
union agreements not to engage in sympathy strikes would be specifically en-
forceable in court only after an arbitrator's ruling that the union indeed had
breached its no-strike obligation.' The rationale of the decision raised the
possibility that numerous work stoppages over other kinds of non-arbitrable
disputes also would be immune from preliminary injunctive relief. In addition,
by emphasizing the undesirability of judicial interference with the functions of
LaGuardia and Taft Hartley, 35 SW. L. J. 899 (1981); Smith, The Supreme Court, Boys Markets Labor
Injunctions, and Sympathy Work Stoppages, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 321 (1977); Comment, Labor Law:
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers: The End to the Erosion of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 55
N.C.L. REV. 1247 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Buffalo Forge Comment]; Comment, Boys
Markets Injunctive Relief in the Sympathy Strike Context: Buffalo Forge From a Management Perspective,
17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 665 (1977); Comment, Sympathy Strike May Not be Enjoined Pending Ar-
bitration of its Legality Under No-Strike Clause of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, 8 SETON HALL L.
REV. 89 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Seton Hall Comment]; Note, Implying Right to Strike in Sym-
pathy: In Support of Buffalo Forge, 8 U.C.L.A. — ALASKA L. REV. 67 (1978); Note, Striking a
Balance Between the Norris-LaGuardia and the Labor Management Relations Acts: Is it Still Feasible After
Buffalo Forge?, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 525 (1977).
For discussions of the relationship between Buffalo Forge and union efforts to enjoin
employer breaches of labor contracts, see Cantor, Buffalo Forge and Injunctions Against Employer
Breaches of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 1980 Wis. L. Rev. 247; Gould, On Labor Injunctions Pen-
ding Arbitration: Recasting Buffalo Forge, 30 STAN. L. REV. 533 (1978); Kratzke, Enjoining Employer
Pending Arbitration, 24 ST. LOUIS L. J. 92 (1979); Comment, Injunctions Restraining Employers Pen-
ding Arbitration: Equity and Labor Policy, 82 DICK. L. REV. 487 (1978); Comment, Boys Markets
Injunctions Against Employers, 91 HARV, L. REV. 715 (1978). See also Simon, Injunctive Relief to
Maintain the Status Quo Pending Arbitration: A Union Practitioner's View, 29th N.Y.U. ANN. CONF.
LAB. 317 (1976); Note, Enjoining Employers Pending Arbitration, 3 IND. REL. L. J. 169 (1979).
5 428 U.S. at 413.
The Court feared intrusive judicial examination of "the merits of the factual and
legal issues that are subjects for the arbitrator." Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428
U.S. at 410-11.
This proposition applies to collective bargaining agreements under which employers
can initiate arbitration proceedings. In response to a strike in alleged breach of a no-strike clause,
an employer under such an agreement may seek both a cease and desist order and damages via
arbitration. Buffalo Forge, however, operates to bar an injunction pending arbitration if the strike
is not over an underlying grievance which is arbitrable, The Court in Buffalo Forge rejected the
notion that a strike is "over" an arbitrable dispute merely because the issue of breach of the no-
strike clause itself is arbitrable. 428 U.S. at 407-10. When the relevant collectively bargained
agreement does not allow the employer to initiate arbitration, the employer can seek damages in
court for the union's breach of a no-strike clause. As interpreted in Buffalo Forge, however, the
Norris-LaGuardia Act still will bar an injunction pending arbitration if the strike is not over an
underlying arbitrable grievance.
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arbitrators, Buffalo Forge raised the specter that Boys Markers injunctions would
be unavailable whenever a union made a colorable claim that the underlying
dispute was not arbitrable. This result would be possible because two of the
prerequisites to Boys Markets injunctions — arbitrability of the underlying
dispute and breach of a no-strike pledge — are themselves issues ultimately
subject to determination by an arbitrator.
This article will discuss Buffalo Forge and its progeny and will explore those
circumstances in which preliminary injunctive relief might still be available
against sympathy strikes and strikes over other non-arbitrable disputes.
Several points will emerge in this examination. First, although Buffalo Forge will
bar preliminary injunctions against sympathy strikes under conventional col-
lective bargaining agreements, injunctive relief may be appropriate when a
union strikes in violation of a status quo clause. Such clauses obligate unions to
arbitrate the contractual legality of a sympathy strike before initiating the
strike. Second, Buffalo Forge does bar injunctions against many strikes prompt-
ed by circumstances beyond the control of an employer, such as governmental
policies. Some of these strikes, however, bear such an attenuated relation to the
strikers' labor interests that they fall outside the Norris-LaGuardia Act's
definition of a labor dispute. In such instances injunctions are not barred by
that Act. Finally, in implementing the admonition of Buffalo Forge against
usurping the role of arbitrators, the lower courts should not eviscerate the pro-
tection afforded by Boys Markets against the forced, strike-induced resolution of
arbitrable disputes. Some judicial-arbitral overlap is inevitable, and by taking
a more active role in addressing certain preliminary issues, such as the arbitra-
bility of disputes and the scope of no-strike clauses, the lower courts would bet-
ter effectuate the national labor policy in favor of arbitration as envisioned by
Boys Markets.
I. ENJOINING SYMPATHY STRIKES
A. Explicit Pledges Not to Engage in Sympathy Strikes
The no-strike clause at issue in Buffalo Forge did not explicitly mention
sympathy strikes. This omission made it possible to argue that an injunction
should be available where the no-strike pledge explicitly includes sympathy
strikes. 9 Indeed, this position found some support in a passage of Justice
6 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), held that some
no-strike injunctions could be issued pursuant to S 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. 5 185(a) (1976), despite the broad ban in the Norris-LaGuardia Act on federal court
injunctions in labor disputes. 398 U.S. at 253. The Court permitted the issuance of 5 301 injunc-
tions to prevent the breach of a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement, so long as
traditional equitable criteria, such as irreparable injury and a balance of equities favoring the
plaintiff, were satisfied. Id. at 254.
9 There is a scintilla of authority for this position. Dictum in a footnote of a circuit
court opinion and a few commentators have espoused the position. See United States Steel v.
U.M.W., 548 F.2d 67, 75 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 968 (1977); Lowden, supra note 4,
at 659; Bulzer, Boys Markets, Injunctions: A Brief Overview, 69 ILL. B. J. 94, 98-99 (1980); Seton
Hall Comment, supra note 4, at 110.
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White's majority opinion in Buffalo Forge which asserted that denying injunc-
tive relief in that case did not deprive the employer of "its bargain .'"°
Both the letter and the spirit of Buffalo Forge, however, refute the notion
that the explicit mention of sympathy strikes in a no-strike clause would sup-
port injunctive relief pending arbitration. Justice White indicated that the con-
tract enforcement policy of section 301 would override the anti-injunction
policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act only when necessary to prevent a union
from avoiding an underlying arbitration pledge. His opinion stated: "[T]he
Court has never indicated that the courts may enjoin actual or threatened con-
tract violations despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act .. . . The allegation . . . that
the union was breaching its obligation not to strike did not in itself warrant an
injunction:'" Indeed, as the dissent correctly noted, the rule established by
the majority was that strikes over non-arbitrable grievances are not enjoinable,
no matter how blatant the breach of a no-strike clause." The basic position of
the Buffalo Forge majority was that Boys Markets injunctions are available only
where necessary to prevent union avoidance of arbitration pledges. The bulk of
commentary has endorsed this view of Buffalo Forge. 13
B. Status Quo Pledges
Boys Markets, as construed in Buffalo Forge, authorizes the issuance of in-
junctions in order to prevent the circumvention of arbitration pledges." Where
a sympathy strike is over an underlying dispute which is not arbitrable, as in
the , underlying economic dispute in Buffalo Forge, there is no danger of the strike
resulting in the coerced settlement of an arbitrable dispute. Where this danger
of circumventing arbitration through coercion is not present, Buffalo Forge re-
quires the courts to refrain from enjoining sympathy strikes. A different result
might obtain, however, if a union has explicitly pledged to arbitrate the issue of
a sympathy strike's legality before instituting the strike.' 5 By staging a sympathy
A recent Ninth Circuit opinion has indicated that sympathy strikes might be en-
joinable under the Railway Labor Act, 845 U.S.C. 151 et seq.,  because that Act is grounded on
policies and dispute resolution machinery somewhat different from that of the NLRA. Trans
Int'l Airlines v. Teamsters, 650 F.2d 949, 964-68 (9th Cir. 1980). The basis for the injunction in
that case was a concern for maintaining the RLA's machinery for minor dispute resolution. Id.
The court viewed the meaning of the no-strike clause (i.e., whether it encompassed sympathy
strikes) as a minor dispute which should be submitted to that machinery before the sympathy
strike was instituted. Id. See also Summit Airlines v. Teamsters Local 295, 628 F.2d 787, 795 (2d
Cir. 1980).
10
 Justice White stated that the sympathy strike in Buffalo Forge "had neither the pur-
pose nor the effect of denying or evading an obligation to arbitrate or of depriving the employer of its
bargain. " 428 U.S. at 408 (emphasis added).
" Id. at 409.
12 Id. at 413-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
13 See, e.g., Ferguson & DiLorenzo, supra note 4, at 834; Rains, Boys Markets injunc-
tions: Strict Scrutiny of The Presumption of Arbitrability, 28 LAB. L.J. 30, 37, 43 (1977). See also Design
& Manufacturing Corp. v. UAW, •608 F.2d 767, 769 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938
(1980).
14 See Campbell "66" Express v. Runde!, 597 F.2d 125, 129-30 (8th Cir. 1979).
t5 See Lowden, supra note 4, at 668. This kind of pledge will be referred to as a "status
quo" pledge in this discussion.
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strike in contravention of such a status quo pledge, a union arguably would
evade its obligation to arbitrate in a manner similar to the way in which a strike
over an underlying arbitrable grievance avoids arbitration. First, a union, if
not enjoined, could use the coercive strike weapon to extract amnesty on the ar-
bitrable issue of whether the sympathy strike violated the status quo pledge in
the first instance. 16 Second, damages for the union's violation of its status quo
pledge would provide inadequate relief from the union's sympathy strike for
the same reasons that Boys Markets found damage remedies to be inadequate
substitutes for preliminary injunctions — namely, the difficulty of fixing dollar
amounts of damages, the difficulty of collecting judgments, and employer
reluctance to exacerbate labor tensions by seeking damages." Thus, the ra-
tionale for permitting initial injunctive enforcement of status quo pledges is the
same as the rationale underlying Boys Markets injunctions: the preservation of
effective arbitration machinery.
The analogy between the injunctive enforcement of a status quo pledge
and injunctive relief in a Boys Markets context extends to the appropriate divi-
sion of functions between the courts and arbitrators in such cases. In a Boys
Markets situation, the arbitrability of the underlying dispute and the scope of
the no-strike clause are preliminary questions for a court. The underlying ar-
bitrable issue, usually the contractual permissibility of some conduct by the
employer, remains for an arbitrator to decide. In the case of a status quo
pledge, a court would merely decide whether the union had promised to ar-
bitrate the legality of the proposed job action before initiating it. The underly-
ing issue remaining for arbitration would be whether the job action violated the
union's no-strike obligation. Sometimes the two issues would merge, as when
the basic question is whether a proposed job action is a "strike" under the con-
tract. The issues for resolution by the courts and by the arbitrators, however,
generally would be separable under this approach.
Additional support for the availability of injunctive relief to enforce a
union's status quo pledge can be found in Justice White's acknowledgement in
Buffalo Forge that injunctions may be issued to enforce an arbitrator's post-
arbitration cease and desist order against a union's sympathy strike."' A con-
tinued sympathy strike in the face of an arbitrator's cease and desist order is
similar to the violation of a prospective duty to arbitrate in that both actions at-
tempt to usurp arbitration. 19 Injunctive relief should be available in both in-
stances. Indeed, an injunction has been allowed which enjoined a strike in pro-
' 6 In Trans Int'l Airlines v. Teamsters, 650 F.2d 949, 966 n.12 (9th Cir. 1981), the
court recognized that the coercive effects of a sympathy strike may moot arbitration of the issue of
the legality of the strike. See Latas-Libby's, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 609 F.2d 25, 27 (1st
Cir. 1979) for an illustration of a union's effort to secure amnesty for illegal strikers.
Of course, there was some risk in Buffalo Forge itself that the sympathy strikers might
seek amnesty and thereby moot arbitration of their strike. But the risk was not severe, as the
employer there had access to expedited arbitration. 428 U.S. at 400.
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248 (1970).
to 428 U.S. at 405.
19 Republic Steel Corp. v. UMW, 570 F.2d 467, 476 (3d Cir. 1978); New Orleans
Steamship Assoc. v. Gen. Longshore Workers, 389 F.2d 369, 371-72 (5th Cir. 1968).
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test of an arbitrator's ruling even without an arbitrator's cease and desist order
against the job action. 20 The court ruled that the post-arbitration protest was,
in effect, an attempt to usurp the prior arbitration and that judicial interven-
tion was appropiate. 2 ' Injunctions to enforce a union's status quo pledge also
would remedy attempts to usurp arbitration.
The current judicial attitude toward injunctive enforcement of status quo
pledges by unions is difficult to determine. No court has considered an explicit
union pledge to arbitrate the legality of a sympathy strike before initiating the
strike. In a case decided just subsequent to Buffalo Forge, the Seventh Circuit
found an implied status quo pledge by a union which was contemplating a sym-
pathy strike." The court based its conclusion that such an obligation existed,
however, on no more than a broad no-strike clause. 23 This judicial approach
seems contrary to Buffalo Forge, which indicated that even a clear breach of a
no-strike clause would not support preliminary judicial relief against a sym-
pathy strike.
An explanation for the dearth of cases construing union status quo pledges
is that such obligations are undertaken more commonly by employers than by
unions. Post-Buffalo Forge cases involving employer status quo pledges offer
mixed signals as to the availability of injunctive relief to enforce such promises.
A number of cases have upheld the issuance of injunctive relief, at least where
the "equitable considerations" test of Boys Markets is met." A recent Seventh
Circuit decision, however, reached a contrary result. In Chicago Typographical
Union v. Chicago Publishers' Association, 25 a union sought a preliminary injunc-
tion pending the arbitration of a dispute over an employer's furlough of
numerous workers." Although the applicable collective bargaining agreement
contained a status quo clause, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the district court's
grant of an injunction against the employer was improper. 27 The court asserted
that the proper forum in which to contest the violation of a status quo obliga-
tion was arbitration." The court's conclusion was based in part on the premise
that interpreting a status quo clause is a matter for an arbitrator rather than a
court."
2° Campbell's "66" Express v. Runde], 597 F.2d 125, 130 (8th Cir. 1979).
21 Id.
22 NLRB v. Keller Crescent Co., 538 F.2d 1291, 1299-1300 (7th Cir. 1976).
22
 The finding in that case, which upheld employer discipline of sympathy strikers, was
unnecessary. The same result could have been reached by simply concluding that the sympathy
strike breached the no-strike clause without finding a precedent union obligation to arbitrate the
legality of the sympathy strike.
24 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Fort Pitt Steel Casting, 598 F.2d. 1273, 1279 (3d
Cir. 1979); Columbia Typographical Union v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 100 L.R.R.M.
2394, 2396 (D.D.C. 1978).
23 620 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1980).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 604.
28 Id.
28 Id. (citing Detroit Newspaper Publishers' Ass'n v. Detroit Typographical Union
Local 18, 471 F.2d 872 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973)).
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The Seventh Circuit position that the interpretation of a status quo clause
is purely for arbitration should be rejected. A status quo pledge is, in effect, a
promise to arbitrate the contractual permissibility of a proposed action before
instituting such action. Refusing to specifically enforce such promises defeats
the clause's purpose of maintaining the status quo pending arbitration. In the
context of an employer's status quo pledge, allowing an employer to take
unilateral action without judicial intervention risks the infliction of irreparable
injury on workers' contractual rights and may provoke wildcat walkouts." In
the context of a union's status quo pledge, allowing a union to engage in a sym-
pathy strike risks mooting the need for arbitration. Allowing such strikes to
continue may result in the forced resolution of the question whether the status
quo clause was breached, and whether the sympathy strike in fact violated the
substantive terms of the agreement."
Although in some instances the language of a collective bargaining agree-
ment may show that the parties anticipated an arbitrator's interpretation of a
status quo clause," the normal inference should be that a status quo promise is
intended to be enforced judicially." The very object of a status quo pledge is to
prevent any action from being undertaken before its legality has been ar-
bitrated. Accordingly, such pledges can be enforced effectively only by prompt
judicial intervention. Such intervention does not improperly usurp the role of
arbitrators. The breach of a status quo obligation may be viewed , as a
preliminary judicial issue in the same fashion that the arbitrability of the
underlying dispute is viewed as a preliminary judicial issue in Boys Markets type
cases.
" See generally Cantor, supra note 4 at 274-82.
" Where an employer takes unilateral action despite a status quo clause, a forced
resolution of the dispute is not as likely as when a union conducts a sympathy strike in violation of
a status quo pledge. A union normally will press for damages through arbitration even when the
employer's action is a fait accompli. Only when the employer's action is temporary and inflicts
non-compensable harm will arbitration be rendered a futility. Nevertheless, a status quo clause
deserves enforcement, in accordance with the expressed intent of the parties, whether a union or
employer is enforcing it.
B See New York Times v. Newspaper and Mail Deliverer's Union, 464 F. Supp. 1281,
1283 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
" Emphasizing the forum contemplated by the parties is consistent with one view of
Buffalo Forge. See Cantor, supra note 4, at 265-67. According to that view, the result in Buffalo Forge
can best be justified as an effecutation of the contracting parties' intentions as to appropriate en-
forcement machinery. Id. Thus, contracting parties may intend that one party is to be entitled to
implement its interpretation of certain contract language, subject to the opposing side's resort to
enforcement machinery to contest the first party's "privilege of first interpretation." Thus, a
contract may give an employer the prerogative of interpreting what consititues "just cause" for
employer discipline and the prerogative of implementing that interpretation, subject to the
union's resort to grievance — arbitration machinery. Similarly, a contract may grant a union the
prerogative of initiating a strike (for example, a strike to honor a "primary picket line"), subject
only to an employer's recourse to whatever enforcement machinery is provided by the contract.
In Buffalo Forge, the collective bargaining agreement provided the employer with recourse to ar-
bitration. 428 U.S. at 405 (1976). See note 7 supra.
If the parties intend to accord one party the privilege of first interpretation of a
disputed contract provision, subject to the other party's resort to arbitration, that format should
be respected. Similarly, if the parites, through a status quo dause, contemplate judicial enforce-
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C. Sympathy Strikes "Over" Arbitrable Grievances of Roving Pickets
Underlying the union's sympathy strike in Buffalo Forge was an economic
dispute between the employer of the sympathy strikers and the union's sister
local. In this circumstance, there was no danger that the sympathy strike would
undermine the arbitration of the underlying dispute which was over prospec-
tive contract terms and non-arbitrable. In other situations, however, the
underlying primary dispute may be arbitrable under a collective bargaining
agreement between the sister union of the sympathy strikers and the sister
union's employer. 34
 Arguably, such sympathy strikes tend to impel a forced
resolution of the underlying dispute, thereby defeating arbitration. 35
 Thus,
employers seeking to enjoin such sympathy strikes can invoke both the contract
enforcement policy of section 301 (as the sympathy strike allegedly breaches the
no-strike clause) and federal policy favoring the resolution of labor disputes by
arbitration. An injunction against a sympathy strike in such circumstances
would promote the arbitration process. Of course, the arbitration promoted
would be pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement to which the sympathy
strikers are not privy. The critical issue is whether this should be a dispositive
factor in determining whether injunctive relief should be granted.
There is a threshhold question as to why the employer of sympathy
strikers would need to seek a section 301 injunction. In theory, the roving
pickets do not pose grave threats to secondary employers whose employees may
honor the picket line and become sympathy strikers. If the underlying dispute
between the primary employer and the roving pickets is arbitrable, the roving
pickets would be subject to a Boys Markets injunction sought by their primary
employer." Such a no-strike injunction ordinarily would force the roving
ment of a pledge not to take action on a disputed interpretation prior to arbitration, that
framework also should be enforced. See Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S. at 409-11, where the Court em-
phasized the importance of implementing the remedial scheme contemplated by the parties.
34
 The possible scenarios vary widely. The "roving" pickets could be from a sister local
of the sympathy striking union or they could be from an entirely separate union. Similarly, the
roving pickets could be employed by an employer who also employs the sympathy strikers, or
they could be employed by a separate employer. In additon, the work locus of the roving pickets
could be distant from that of the sympathy strikers, or it could be close or even shared. In this
discussion, the term "employer" is used loosely, without reference to the possibility that the
same employer may be treated as separate "persons" for purposes of 8(b)(4) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 5 158(b)(4). See general?), Casenote, Court May Enjoin Sympathy
Strike Where Pupose and Effect is to Compel Concession of Arbitrable Issue, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 507
(1978); Casenote, Labor Management Relations Act — A Cause of Action Exists Under Section 30I(A)
Against a Sympathy Striking Union When the Underlying Dispute is Subject to Compulsory Arbitration Be-
tween the Parties to the Dispute, and When the Parties at Odds in the Action for Breach of an Implied No-Strike
Obligation are the Same, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV, 124 (1979) [hereinafter cited as George
Washington Casenote].
" A sympathy strike could create pressure to settle the underlying dispute outside ar-
bitration where the primary employer and secondary employer are the same, as in Buffalo Forge,
or where the employer of the sympathy strikers (the secondary employer) does a significant
volume of business with the employer of the roving pickets (the primary employer). In the latter
case, the secondary employer could exert economic pressure on the primary employer, forcing it
to capitulate to the demands of the roving pickets.
36 See Jim Walter Resources v. UMW, 609 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1980), where a
mineowner obtained an injunction against picketing both at the primary situs where the underly-
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pickets back to work at their primary place of employment pending arbitration
of the underlying arbitrable dispute. Terminating the picketing at the secon-
dary location usually would terminate the sympathy strike. Certain practical
problems, however, tend to inhibit this easy solution. For example, where the
primary strike is a wildcat, possibly employing hit and run picketing tactics and
sometimes reaching widely disparate locations, problems arise with effective
service of process, assertion of jurisdiction, and assemblage of evidence. 37 An
additional problem is that an injunction may not be available against the rov-
ing pickets because the primary employer cannot satisfy the "equitable con-
siderations" formula of Boys Markets in all these circumstances where the
primary employer cannot obtain an injunction against the roving pickets, the
• availability of an injunction against sympathy strikers honoring the "illegal"
picket line becomes an important issue."
Most courts have refused to issue injunctions against sympathy strikers
where the employer of the sympathy strikers asserts that the underlying dispute
between the roving pickets and their employer is arbitrable." An injunction
has been refused even where the roving pickets were wildcatters defying the
directions of their union, and the sympathy strikers had no particularized in-
terest in the underlying dispute provoking the pickets. 4 ' These courts view Buf-
falo Forge as authorizing an injunction against sympathy strikers only where the
strikers are avoiding their own contractual obligation to arbitrate a dispute.
ing dispute arose and at a second mine owned by the same employer, which the roving pickets
sought to embroil in the dispute. Id. at 167.
" Such problems have occurred commonly in the coal industry. See, e.g., Bituminous
Coal Operators Ass'n v. UMW, 585 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1978); United States Steel Corp. v.
UMW, 418 F. Supp. 172 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
Strikes and their resolution pose particularly complex issues in the coal industry
because the no-strike obligation typically is implied from the arbitration agreement rather than
being expressly stated. Consequently, a sympathy strike almost by definition cannot violate a no-
strike pledge by the sympathy strikers. Because such a strike is not generally considered to be
over an arbitratable grievance, they have not violated the arbitration pledge which in turn deter-
mines the scope of their no-strike obligation. See United States Steel v. UMW, 548 F.2d 67, 73
(3d Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 431 U.S. 968 (1977); Note, Damage Remedies for Sympathy Strikes after Buf-
falo Forge, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1664, 1671-73 (1978); George Washington Casenote, supra note
34.
" Seeking an injunction under 5 301 is not the secondary employer's only option.
Where the employer of the sympathy strikers is a separate "person" from the primary employer
for purposes of 5 8(b)(4), an unfair labor practice charge, and a temporary injunction under 5 10
(1), 29 U.S.C. 5 160(1), is possible recourse. See Buffalo Forge Comment, supra note 4, at 1260
n.82. Cf. Perritt, Am I My Brother's Keeper? Secondary Picketing Under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 68
CEO. L. J. 1191 (1980) (discussing injunctions against secondary strikes under the Railway
Labor Act). A temporary injunction under 5 10(1) is not available where the two employers in-
volved are treated as a single person or employer under 5 8(b)(4). See Teamsters Local 560, 248
N.L.R.B. 1212, 1214-15 (1980).
39 See Zeigler Coal Co. v. UMW, 566 F.2d 582, 584-85 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 912 (1978); Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. UMW, 551 F.2d 695, 702-05 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 876 (1977); United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 418 F. Supp. 172, 174-75 (W.D. Pa.
1976).
49 See Zeigler Coal Co. v. UMW, 566 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
912 (1978); Southern Ohio Co. v. UMW, 551 F.2d 695 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876
(1977). Roving picket lines in the coal industry generally are honored because miners almost in-
stinctively make common cause with their fellow miners. Occasionally, threats and intimidation
by the roving pickets may contribute to such unanimity.
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These courts deem the roving pickets' avoidance of their arbitration obligation
under a separate collective bargaining agreement to be irrelevant."
These courts' reliance on Buffalo Forge is unconvincing. Buffalo Forge did
focus on the arbitrability of issues between the sympathy strikers and their
employer. But in that case, the underlying dispute between the roving pickets
and their employer was clearly non-arbitrable. Thus, the Supreme Court sim-
ply had no occasion to address the relevance or significance of an underlying
arbitrable dispute between the roving pickets and their employer. Buffalo Forge
does not, therefore, foreclose consideration of the nexus between a sympathy
strike in breach of contract and the subversion of the arbitration process under
a separate contract.
Other reasons have been advanced for not considering the possible con-
nection between sympathy strikes and the evasion of arbitration by the roving
pickets. The Sixth Circuit has asserted that such an inquiry "improperly shifts
the focus ... from the employees against whom the injunction is sought to the
illegal pickets."" As specific concerns, the court cited "problems of proof,"
and complex judgments about the legality of the picket line being "forced" on
sympathy strikers honoring the line." These concerns, however, seem more il-
lusory than real. The burden of producing evidence in such cases on such ques-
tions as identification of the underlying dispute and arbitrability of that dispute
Supporting this view of Buffalo Forge are Freed, supra note 4, at 331, and Cohen, 3011 i
N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. LAB., at 187 (1977). In Zeigler Coal Co. v. UMW, 566 F.2d 582 (7th Cir.
1977), the court intimated that an injunction would be appropriate if the sympathy strikers were
shown to have "a direct and beneficial interest" in the underlying arbitrable dispute between the
roving pickets and their employer. 566 F.2d at 585. The reasoning of the Zeigler court appears to
have been that sympathy strikers in some sense avoid their own arbitration pledge if they have "a
beneficial interest" in the underlying arbitrable dispute of the roving pickets. Whatever the
reasoning of Zeigler may have been, the "direct and beneficial interest" test proposed by the court
would present a difficult standard for judicial intervention. Under this test, courts would have to
determine whether sympathy strikers have a sufficiently direct interest in the underlying dispute
to warrant injunctive relief. Several questions would arise in this regard. For example, would it
be enough if both sets of workers operated under collective bargaining agreements which contain-
ed similar or identical provisions? The Zeigler court answered this question in the negative. 566
F.2d at 585. Would the sympathy strikers have a "direct and beneficial interest" in the underly-
ing dispute if they hoped or expected their employer to follow any settlement reached between the
roving pickets and their employer? How closely would the dispute between the roving pickets and
their employer have to relate to the work conditions of the sympathy strikers? The Zeigler court
left these questions unanswered. Moreover, sympathy strikers commonly are tied to roving
pickets either on a "common cause" basis, or because the sympathy strikers have an interest in
industry-wide work conditions. See Western Md. R.R. Co. v. System Bd. of Adjustment, 465 F.
Supp. 963, 972 (D. Md. 1979). In this sense, sympathy strikers almost always adopt as their own
the underlying arbitrable grievance of the roving pickets. In short, the "beneficial interest" or
community of interest test would not appear to be a useful standard for measuring the ap-
propriateness of injunctive relief. But see Cedar Coal Co. v. UMW, 560 F.2d 1153, 1171-72 (4th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1047 (1978).
Similar issues concerning the proximity of the underlying dispute to the work condi-
tions of strikers arise in efforts to define a "labor dispute" under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See
Perritt, supra note 38, at 1208; and discussion in text at notes 65-81 infra.
42 Southern Ohio Coal v. UMW, 551 F.2d 695, 704 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,434
U.S. 876 (1977). See also George Washington Casenote, supra note 34, at 135.
" Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. UMW, 551 F.2d 695, 704 (6th Cir. 1977).
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— always will be on the employer seeking the injunction. If the employer suc-
ceeds in meeting this burden, the court should be responsive. Furthermore, the
evidentiary problems which concerned the Sixth Circuit may not be so dif-
ficult, particularly where the "roving" pickets and the sympathy strikers have
a common employer. The "complex judgment" which the sympathy strikers
must make about the legality of a picket line is an equally unpersuasive argu-
ment against granting a sympathy strike injunction. At the point of judicial in-
tervention, a court rather than the worker will be making the complex judg-
ment in question. Moreover, the basic question for the prospective sympathy
strikers and their union is whether the sympathy strike violates their own no-
strike pledge. These workers must face that question — for purposes of risking
discipline by their employer — even if an injunction against the sympathy
strike is not being sought." In short, the determinative question is whether there
is a sufficient nexus between the sympathy strike and the avoidance of arbitra-
tion to justify the issuance of a Boys Markets injunction against the sympathy
strikers.
Along these lines, the Fourth Circuit, in Cedar Coal v. UMW, 45 adopted an
interpretation of Buffalo Forge which permits enjoining a sympathy strike where
the strike's purpose is to force a common employer to concede an arbitrable
issue to roving pickets." In Cedar Coal, one UMW local struck over an ar-
bitrable grievance and picketed other mines which were owned by the same
employer (Cedar) and manned by sister UMW locals. The UMW local also
picketed a mine owned by another employer (Southern Ohio). 47 The Fourth
Circuit upheld the grant of an injunction to Cedar against both the primary
strikers (the roving pickets) and the sympathy strikers, since the basic object of
each strike was to compel Cedar to concede the underlying arbitrable issue (to
the primary strikers)." The court refused, however, to authorize an injunction
on behalf of the outside employer (Southern Ohio) against its sympathy strik-
ing employees. The court reasoned that since Southern Ohio was not privy to
the underlying dispute, it could not itself concede the underlying arbitrable
issue." Apparently, any pressure which Southern Ohio might place on Cedar
to settle the dispute was regarded as being too attenuated a threat to arbitration
to warrant injunctive relief.
The facts of Cedar Coal render the future application of the decision uncer-
" Employees may be disciplined for refusing to cross a secondary picket line, Chevron
USA, 244 N.L.R.B. 1081, 1086-87 (1979), or for any sympathy strike which violates a no-strike
pledge. See W-1 Canteen Serv. v. NLRB, 606 F.2d 738, 744-47 (7th Cir. 1979); Iowa Beef Pro-
cesssors v. Meat Cutters, 597 F.2d 1138, 1144-45 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979).
Thus, workers may be better off if they are enjoined prospectively from sympathy striking than if
they are disciplined after the fact.
" 560 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1047 (1978),
" 560 F.2d at 1171-72. The Third Circuit also appears to support this approach. See
United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 593 F.2d 201, 206-09 (3d Cir. 1979). Freed, supra note 4, at
328-34, however, criticizes the approach.
" 560 F.2d at 1160.
" Id. at 1171-72.
44 Id. at 1172.
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taro. The court in Cedar Coal noted that not only were the enjoined sympathy
strikers employed by the same employer as were the roving pickets, but that
both employee groups were governed by the same master collective bargaining
agreement. This fact created a possibility, in the court's view, that the sym-
pathy strikers might profit in some fashion from the resolution of the arbitrable
grievance. 50 This factor was speculative," however, and should not prove
critical for analytical purposes." Cedar Coal should be read as endorsing the
broader principle that the presence of an arbitrable underlying dispute between
a sister local and the employer who also employs the sympathy strikers may
support an injunction against the sympathy strikers.
Where, as in Cedar Coal, a single employer employs both the roving pickets
and the sympathy strikers, the primary recourse for that employer is to enjoin
the primary strikers (roving pickets) and thereby squelch the roving picket
line." The sympathy strike would then dissolve by itself. Where the roving
pickets are employed by a separate employer, however, the employer of the
sympathy strikers must seek to enjoin the sympathy strike directly. The in-
triguing question then arises whether the employer may enjoin the sympathy
strike on the basis that the roving pickets are seeking to apply indirect economic
pressure to force the resolution of an arbitrable dispute between the roving
pickets and their employer. The employer could forward the theory, rejected in
Cedar Coal, that the sympathy strike undermines arbitration by pressuring it, a
neutral employer, to coerce the roving pickets' employer to concede the ar-
bitrable issue. If the facts support this theory, an injunction against the sym-
pathy strike arguably would foster the policy in favor of arbitration expressed
in Boys Markets and Buffalo Forge. This theory assumes a significant business
relationship between the two employers involved, which creates the potential
for real economic pressure on the roving pickets' employer to concede the
underlying dispute to the prejudice of arbitration."' The problematical nature
of such an inquiry into the economic relationship between the two employers
" Id.
" The court suggested that an arbitration award favoring the roving pickets might have
a limited precedential effect as to the sympathy strikers who were governed by the same master
collective bargaining agreement. Id. Although legally correct, this position overlooks the practical
fact that the strikes were aimed at avoiding arbitration through a forced resolution of the dispute.
The precedential impact of such forced resolutions is at best uncertain. See Freed, supra note 4, at
332-34 n.190.
52 Reserving sympathy strike injunctions for situations where the sympathy strikers
have some beneficial interest in the underlying dispute of the roving pickets probably is not a
fruitful line of inquiry. See note 41 supra.
The Cedar Coal opinion also indicated at one point that both the pickets and sympathy
strikers worked at the same location. 560 F.2d at 1172. The facts as related in an earlier portion
of the opinion, however, seem to contradict this conclusion. Id. at 1156, 1159.
"See Jim Walter Resources v. UMW, 609 F.2d 165, 167-69 (5th Cir. 1980). Where the
primary strikers are breaching their own pledge to arbitrate the underlying dispute, their strike
normally can be enjoined under Boys Markets.
" See Casenote, Court May Enjoin Sympathy Strike Where Purpose and Effect is to Compel Con-
cession of Arbitrable Issue, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 507, 523 (1978).
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and the potential impact of the sympathy strike on arbitration, however, cau-
tions against strict reliance on this theory as a means of enjoining sympathy
strikes. A more workable approach to the problem would be to focus on the ob-
ject or purpose of the roving pickets, rather than the likely impact of the sym-
pathy strike on arbitration. Under this approach, if the roving pickets act with
the purpose of forcing the neutral employer to pressure their employer to settle
an arbitrable dispute, an injunction would be warranted. Focusing on the in-
tention of the roving pickets admittedly strays from the underlying concern of
preventing the disruption of arbitration machinery through forced concession.
Yet the object of the roving pickets to circumvent arbitration arguably is more
critical than the actual effect of their actions. The sympathy strikers are then
violating a no-strike clause in an effort to assist an evasion of arbitration, and
that should be sufficient to invoke Boys Markets. By analogy, in Boys Markets
cases, no inquiry is necessary into whether an employer actually would
capitulate on the arbitrable issue.
A complicating factor in the scenario posited is that it is the employer of
the roving pickets, not the employer seeking the injunction against the sym-
pathy strikers, who controls the arbitration of the underlying dispute. Normal-
ly, an employer seeking a Boys Markets injunction must agree to arbitrate as a
prerequisite to obtaining injunctive relief. In the hypothetical case under con-
sideration, however, the employer who must arbitrate the primary dispute may
not even be a party before the court. This apparent bar to obtaining a sym-
pathy strike injunction could be remedied by allowing the employer seeking the
injunction to demonstrate that the employer of the roving pickets is willing to
arbitrate the underlying dispute. If the neutral employer can establish this fact,
a sympathy strike injunction should be available.
In sum, Buffalo Forge does not foreclose injunctive relief against sympathy
strikers where the underlying dispute between the roving pickets and their
employer is arbitrable. The objections formulated in the line of cases holding to
the contrary are unpersuasive. The focus of inquiry should be whether the rov-
ing pickets' evasion of their arbitration obligation sufficiently implicates federal
arbitration enforcement policy to permit a section 301 injunction against the
sympathy strikers. Although Buffalo Forge does not resolve this delicate policy-
balancing issue, permitting sympathy strike injunctions in such circumstances
would be consistent with the pro-arbitration policy underlying that decision.
There is no reason why that policy should not support injunctive relief where a
union's sympathy strike in breach of a no-strike clause is aimed at assisting
another union's efforts to evade an arbitration obligation."
" If Cedar Coal is followed, so that 301 injunctions are not available against sympathy
strikes where separate employers are involved, the employer facing roving pickets still may have
some recourse against the pickets themselves. Section 8(b)(4)'s ban on secondary boycotts might
provide grounds for injunctive relief, although the General Counsel and not the employer con-
trols this channel. See note 38 supra.
Since an employer ordinarily has no contractual tie to roving pickets who work for
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II. OTHER NON-ARBITRABLE DISPUTES
Buffalo Forge's restriction of no-strike injunctions to the enforcement of ar-
bitration pledges left open several questions regarding the availability of in-
junctive relief under a broad no-strike clause. Certain issues may be explicitly
or implicitly beyond the scope of a contract's arbitration clause. In addition,
workers sometimes engage in work stoppages over matters which essentially
are beyond the control of their employer. Such disputes generally are non-
another employer, no direct 301 suit against the roving pickets would be available. See Con-
solidation Coal Co. v. UMW, 537 F.2d 1226, 1230 (4th Cir. 1976). Where the same parent
union represents both the sympathy strikers and the roving pickets, however, some relief may be
available to the employer. The interconnections between the unions, along with certain contrac-
tual language, may suggest some responsibility on the part of the union representing the sym-
pathy strikers to control the roving pickets. The same factors may create liability running from
the roving pickets to employers other than their own. Along these lines, a few cases suggest the
possibility of attacking the parent union in order to preclude the extension or proliferation of a
strike over one local's dispute to other employers. See United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 593 F.
2d 201 (3d Cir. 1979); Republic Steel Corp. v. UMW, 570 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1978); Peabody
Coal Co. v. UMW, 430 F. Supp. 205 (E. D. Mo. 1977). This approach would apply where the
international or parent local is a signatory to the collective bargaining agreement with the
employer of the potential sympathy strikers, and where this same union signatory also has the
authority under the union's structure to control or influence the roving pickets. This notion has
arisen principally in UMW cases concerning the damage liability of the parent UMW union
which had signed each collective bargaining agreement in the industry on behalf of its locals.
Peabody Coal Co. v. UMW, 430 F. Supp. 205, 206 (E.D. Mo. 1977). In Republic Steel Corp.
v. UMW, 570 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1978), the court found that the parent UMW potentially was
liable to one mine owner for failing to take steps against the proliferation of work stoppages over
an arbitrable dispute at another employer's mine. Id. at 478. This theory would seem potentially
applicable to injunctive actions where the parent union is undermining arbitration by not fulfill-
ing its contracutal obligation to prevent the proliferation of a strike over an arbitrable grievance.
It should be observed, however, that this theory is dependant entirely on extraordinary contrac-
tual language, and unusual divisions of union responsibility. Consequently, the theory would be
limited in its application.
The extent of union liability for failing to avert a strike has been circumscribed by
Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 444 U.S. 212, 214-18 (1979). The Court in Carbon Fuel narrowly in-
terpreted the UMW's responsibilities under the Bituminous Coal Agreements. Nevertheless, the
principle of an international union's responsibility remains unaffected where appropriate con-
tract language exists. In United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 593 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1979), the
court used the parent UMW's signatory status and internal union interconnections to find poten-
tial damage liability on the part of a mineworkers' local. Id. at 208-09. The local had honored a
picket line set up by a sister local whose members worked for the same mineowner as did the sym-
pathy strikers, and whose underlying dispute was arbitrable. Id. Ordinarily, a local's damage
liability for a sympathy strike would depend simply on the scope of the local's no-strike pledge
and not on the arbitrability of the dispute between the sister union and the employer. In the min-
ing industry, however, strike liability becomes a particularly complex issue. Although the inter-
national may sign the collective bargaining agreements, jurisdiction to administer the
agreements may be divided among the international, the union district, and the union local.
More importantly, the no-strike obligation of mineworkers typically is not expressed, but is im-
plied from the customary broad grievance-arbitration clause. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp.
v. UMW, 598 F.2d 363, 364 (5th Cir. 1979); United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 593 F.2d 201,
203-04 (3d Cir. 1978). The scope of the arbitration pledge, and the precise union entities bound
by that pledge, shape the contours of liability for a strike. Without binding ties among the rele-
vant union entities, a genuine sympathy strike never could breach an implied no-strike obligation
on the part of the sympathy strikers. See also note 37 supra. Note, Damage Remedies for Sympathy
Strikes iffier Buffalo Forge, 78 COLUM. L. REV, 1664, 1671-73 (1978); George Washington
Casenote, supra note 34, at 1241.
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arbitrable as between the striking workers and their employer. For example,
workers may strike in protest of a governmental policy, their unions's alleged
inadequacies, or a separate employer's conduct. Buffalo Forge made clear that a
no-strike injunction is inappropriate if the particular underlying dispute is out-
side the scope of an arbitration clause, but the opinion did not establish judicial
standards with respect to the initial determination of whether a dispute is in
fact arbitrable. Buffalo Forge also did not address whether strikes over matters
beyond an employer's control and only distantly related to work conditions
qualify as "labor disputes" under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. This issue is im-
portant because the Act's broad ban on injunctive relief applies only to such
disputes. Questions of enjoinability also arise when a union strikes in support
of an alteration to an existing collective bargaining agreement. Prospective
contract changes ordinarily are not arbitrable. The remainder of this aritcle
will address these issues arising in the wake of Buffalo Forge, and will offer some
conclusions.
A. Subjects Outside a Collective Bargaining Agreement,
and Matters Beyond an Employer's Control.
A strike customarily is provoked by worker dissatisfaction over manage-
ment action or inaction. During the course of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, such management conduct ordinarily is subject to challenge as a viola-
tion of that agreement. The dispute generally can be resolved by the grievance-
arbitration machinery established by the parties. Not every labor dispute,
however, fits this neat framework.
It also may be possible for a parent union which represents multiple bargaining units
to create no-strike obligations running from one unit's employees to a separate employer. An in-
teresting example of the creation of such an obligation occurred in Amalgamated Meat Cutters
Local 195 v. Cross Bros. Meat Packers, 518 F.2d 1113 (3d Cir. 1975). In that case, Local 195
represented two bargaining units who worked for separate employers located across the street
from one another. Id. at 1115. Employees in one bargaining unit struck against their employer,
and set up a picket line which members of the second bargaining unit honored. The sympathy
strikers had made a no-strike pledge which their employer alleged had been breached. Id. The
Third Circuit upheld an arbitrator's decision which awarded damages to the second employer
based on the activities of both the sympathy strikers and the roving pickets. Id. at 1119-22. The
finding of liability running from the roving pickets to a separate employer was grounded on Local
195's common representation of both bargaining units, and on contractual language binding the
local and "its members." All cases which have found liability running from roving pickets to
separate employers have arisen in the context of damage actions. The principle supporting liabili-
ty for damages, however, would seem equally applicable to cases in which a separate employer
seeks to enjoin roving pickets. Cf. Western Md. R.R. Co. v. System Bd. of Adjustment, 465 F.
Supp. 963, 973-75 (D. Md. 1979) (Railway Labor Act case in which two railroads succeeded in
obtaining limited injunctive relief against roving pickets who worked for a rival railroad).
Obtaining injunctive relief against roving pickets employed by a separate employer
always will be dependent on contract language. The language must create special obligations
running from workers in one bargaining unit to a separate employer with whom the union also
has a contract. Such language is rare. Moreover, the workers must be represented by the same
parent union, and internal disciplinary machinery must exist to implement the interconnected
union obligations being alleged. See Republic Steel Corp. v. UMW, 570 F.2d 467, 478-79 (3d
Cir. 1978). Thus, employers faced with roving pickets who work for a separate employer will be
relegated primarily to S 8(b)(4) or 301. Relief under those provisions must be grounded either
on an explicit status quo pledge or on an extension of the Cedar Coal theory, as discussed above.
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Labor disputes sometimes originate from matters beyond the jurisdic-
tional scope of a particular collective bargaining agreement. In such cases, the
underlying dispute may not be arbitrable and consequently an injunction may
be barred under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Ninth Circuit case of Alaska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Teanzsters66 presents an example of how a dispute outside
the scope of the collective bargaining agreement may be unenjoinable. In that
case, workers on the Alaska pipeline were employed under an agreement
covering "new construction work" at the pipeline." When a strike was
precipitated by a dispute over certain "backhaul" work at a tanker loading
facility, a no-strike injunction was denied because the dispute was considered
to be outside the scope of the collective bargaining agreement. 58 The court
denied the injunction even though the agreement contained a broad no-strike
provision which an arbitrator later found had been breached by the walkout in
question."
Another instance in which the underlying dispute may be non-arbitrable
and therefore not enjoinable occurs when a strike is precipitated by worker
discontent over matters entirely beyond the control of their employer. For ex-
ample, workers may strike to protest governmental policies. The protest may
be connected to work conditions, as when government wage controls or
guidelines are in issue, or it may be essentially political, as when longshoremen
refuse to load grain on ships bound for the Soviet Union. If the protested mat-
ter is beyond the employer's control," and non-arbitrable, an injunction would
appear to be barred by Buffalo Forge. This approach was followed by the Fifth
Circuit in U.S. Steel v. UMW. 6 ' In that case, a miner's union struck one coal
mine operator to protest another employer's importation of South African
coal." Despite a broad arbitration provision which covered "disagreements
over any matter not mentioned" in the agreement and "local trouble of any
kind," the court refused to authorize an injunction against the strikers." The
court reasoned that since the underlying dispute concerned a separate
employer, it was not arbitrable as between the striking union and its immediate
56 557 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1977).
" Id. at 1266 n.3.
58 Id. at 1265-66, The court found that "backhaul" work was not "new construction
work."
" Id. Once the arbitrator's ruling had been obtained, the district court specifically en-
forced the arbitration award. Id. The Ninth Circuit ruled only that the initial denial of an injunc-
tion had been correct. Id. at 1267-68.
so Of course, a court must determine what underlying dispute actually precipitated the
work stoppage. For example, the UMW sometimes has contended that work stoppages were
"over" previous judicial meddling in labor disputes, a contention which has been rejected. See
Cedar Coal v. UMW, 560 F.2d at 1159, 1171.
°' 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976).
62 Id. at 1238.
63 Id. at 1239.
May 1982]	 NON-ARBITRABLE DISPUTES 	 649
employer." The Fourth and Fifth Circuits recently have taken a similar ap-
proach in refusing to enjoin longshoremen's work stoppages initiated in protest
of the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. 65
Such disputes, where workers are protesting matters well beyond their
employer's control, usually are not arbitrable. Even where the underlying
dispute is non-arbitrable, however, Buffalo Forge does not bar a section 301 in-
junction unless the Norris-LaGuardia Act is applicable. That Act bans injunc-
tions only in cases "involving or growing out of any labor dispute . . . "66 Thus,
the critical issue in this context is whether the particular strike sought to be en-
joined falls within the Norris-LaGuardia Act's definition of "labor dispute. "67
The resolution of this issue in turn depends on whether the underlying dispute
which triggered the particular strike bears a sufficient nexus to the terms and
conditions of employment of the striking workers to qualify them as "inter-
ested" in that underlying dispute. This test for defining a labor dispute is sug-
gested by Supreme Court precedent, 68 by the legislative history of the Norris-
64 Id. at 1247-48. Some pre-Buffalo Forge cases enjoined "political strikes" partially on
the basis that the contractual legality of the strike itself was arbitrable, and therefore the strike
could be deemed to be "over" an arbitrable issue. See United States Steel v. UMW, 87
L.R.R.M. 2806, 2807-09 (4th Cir. 1974); Armoc Steel Corp. v. UMW, 505 F.2d 1129, 1132-34
(4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975). This approach was repudiated in Buffalo Forge.
428 U.S. 397, 408 (1975).
65 Hampton Roads Shipping Ass'n v. ILA, 631 F.2d 282, 285-86 (4th Cir. 1980); New
Orleans Steamship Ass'n v. ILA, 626 F.2d 455, 467 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 450 U.S. 1029
(1981); see Note, The Statutory Implications of Politically Motivated Work Stoppages, 27 LOYOLA L.
REV. 667 (1981).
66 29 U.S.C.	 104 (1976).
67 29 U.S.C. S 113:
(a) A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when the case
involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupa-
tion; or have direct or indirect interest therein; or who are employees of the same
employer; or who are members of the same or an affiliated organzation of
employers or employees; whether such dispute is (1) between . . . employers ..
and ... employees; (2) between	 employers ... and ... employers; or
(3) between ... employees and ... employees; or when the case involves any
conflicting or competing interests in a "labor dispute" ... of "persons par-
ticipating or interested" therein ...
(b) A person or association shall be held to be a person participating or interested
in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or it, and if he or it is engaged in
the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation in which such dispute occurs, or has
a direct or indirect interest therein ...
(c) The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or con-
ditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons
in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or con-
ditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee . .
68 See Federation of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99, 105-06 (1968); Marine Cooks &
Stewards v. Panama Steamship, 362 U.S. 365, 370-71 (1960). Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649, 654-55 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 385 U.S. 20 (1966) represents a
strong lower court adoption of the test.
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LaGuardia Act," and by a recent line of cases granting no-strike injunctions
under the Railway Labor Act."
There is no simplistic formula for determining when a problem beyond
the control of an employer is sufficiently unconnected to its striking
employees'economic self-interest to disqualify the strike from protection under
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. That the resolution of the underlying problem is
beyond the struck employer's control, or that the strikers' employment condi-
tions will not be affected directly by the dispute's resolution, are not
dispositive. It is well established that workers may be "interested" in an
underlying dispute involving a separate employer even if their own work condi-
tions are not directly affected by the resolution of the dispute. When the Norris-
LaGuardia Act was enacted, Congress accepted the principle that workers
have a genuine "interest" in employment conditions within their industry or
economic sector." When the underlying dispute concerns such conditions,
striking employees are protected by the Norris-LaGuardia Act even if the
dispute will have no immediate impact on their own work conditions. 72 To
some extent, Buffalo Forge illustrates this principle, as that decision insulated a
sympathy strike against an injunction even though the strikers would not im-
mediately benefit from a resolution of the underlying dispute."
69 The legislative history of the Norris-LaGuardia Act concerning the scope of the term
"labor dispute" as used in the Act is not conclusive. In hearings on the House bill, opponents of
the Act argued that the bill's language would insulate labor activity from injunctions even where
the underlying dispute bore only a remote relationship to employee work conditions. See, e.g.,
Hearing before House Comm. on the Judiciary on H. R. 5315, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 13, 22 (1932)
(remarks of a representative of the National Association of Manufacturers). Propenents of the
Act stressed that the Act was only intended to insulate traditional, "legitimate" labor activity. Id.
at 48, 67-68. In its form, the legislation appears to have embodied a limitation that labor activity
must be related to employment conditions in order to be protected against injunctions. See S.
REP. to accompany S. 935, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9, 25:
The main purpose of these definitions [in S 13 of the Act] is to provide for limiting
the injunctive powers of the Federal courts only in the special type of cases, com-
monly called labor disputes, in which ... the courts have been converted into
policing agencies *" to the purpose of aiding employers to coerce employees into
accepting terms and conditions of employment desired by employers.
7° See Asheley, Drew & Northern Ry. Co. v. UTU, 625 F.2d 1357, 1363-66 (8th Cir.
1980); Western Md. R.R. Co. v. System Bd. of Adjustment, 465 F. Supp. 963, 970-72 (D. Md.
1979); Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. BRAC, 458 F. Supp. 100, 102 (E.D. Mo. 1978). But see BRT v.
Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 392-93 (1969). See generally Perritt, supra note 38; Note,
Judicial Approaches to Secondary Boycotts Under the Railway Labor Act, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 928 (1967).
71
 Congress apparently determined that workers have a significant interest in any
labor-management controversy within the same industry. "A case shall be held to involve or to
grow out of a labor dispute when the case involves persons who are engaged in the same industry,
trade, craft or occupation . " 29 U.S.C. 5113(a) (1976). See United Steelworkers v. Bishop,
598 F.2d 408, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1979); 11 MEMPHIS ST. L. REV. 135 (1980).
72 See Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama Steamship, 362 U.S. 365, 370 (1960);
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Florida East Ry., 346 F.2d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 1965);
Note, Declaratory Judgment is Appropriate Relief in a Non-Arbitrable 301 Labor Dispute Concerning a Col-
lective Bargaining Agreement with a No-Strike Clause, 10 SETON HALL L. REV. 471 (1979).
79
 See also NLRB v. Gould, Inc., 638 F.2d 159, 163-64 (10th Cir. 1980); Eastex, Inc. v.
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Where the dispute does not concern employment conditions within the in-
dustry, courts have been more chary of protecting strikers against injunctions.
A number of cases have held that when the underlying dispute is related in too
attenuated a fashion to the strikers' labor conditions, the strike is not protected
by the Norris-LaGuardia Act." To the extent that an underlying dispute is
purely political, with the strikers' "interest" being no more particularized than
that of other citizens expressing a view on the subject, these cases seem
correct." Thus, a union's strike to protest a foreign country's policy would not
constitute a "labor dispute," under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, unless the
union could demonstrate some cognizable economic interest in the dispute."
The same economic self-interest test applies to purely domestic situations
in which the underlying dispute involves governmental policy or the conduct of
another employer which the struck employer cannot control. As discussed
above, when the underlying dispute involves an employer in the same industry
as the struck employer, the sympathy strike may not be enjoined. With respect
to disputes arising outside the industry, however, striking workers presumably
must demonstrate some economic interest in the underlying dispute in order to
qualify for Norris-LaGuardia protection." Demonstrating this interest re-
quires more than the invocation of labor's "common cause" — the notion that
concerted activity to benefit outside workers will eventually earn reciprocal
support from those workers. That rationale for claiming economic self-interest
NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 563-70 (1978) (discussing the scope of NLRA protection of workers' con-
certed activities).
" See West Coast Gulf Maritime Ass'n v. ILA, 413 F. Supp. 372, 374-75 (S.D. Tex.
1975), aff'd without opinion, 531 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1976); Khedivial Line v. Seafarers' Union, 278
F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1960); United States Steel v. UMW, 77 L.R.R.M. 3134, 3135 (E.D. Ky.
1971); cf. Allied Intl, Inc. v. ILA, 492 F. Supp. 334, 338 (D. Mass. 1980); Harrington & Co. v.
ILA, 356 F. Supp. 1079, 1081-83 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton,
315 U.S. 143 (1942). See also cases cited in notes 68 and 70 supra.
76 Contra, New Orleans Steamship Ass'n v. ILA, 626 F.2d 455, 464-65 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. granted, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981). It is possible that a political strike might be deemed an illegal
secondary boycott under 8(b)(4) of the NLRA and thus be enjoinable under 5 10(1). Such
strikes are calculated to achieve union objectives beyond the workers' labor relations setting, and
hence are "secondary" in a sense. The First Circuit has adopted this position. Allied Int'l. v.
ILA, 640 F.2d 1368, 1377-79 (1st Cir. 1981). The Fifth Circuit, however, has ruled that such
strikes do not violate 5 8(b)(4), either because they are not aimed at affecting domestic labor con-
ditions or because of the potential impact of judicial interference on foreign entities and foreign
trade. See ILA Local 799, 257 N.L.R.B. No. 151, #1-CC-1753 (ALJ decision Mar. 16, 1981).
76 Some "political" strikes protest matters having no connection to the strikers' work-
ing conditions. The refusal by longshoremen to handle Soviet cargo in protest of the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan provides an example. In that instance, the International Longshoremen's
Association "sought no economic advantage or benefit for its member[s] .. . . [Its boycotts
were] wholly political in nature, and in fact detrimental to the immediate interests of
longshoremen by causing a reduction in the work available to them." ILA Local 799, 257
N.L.R.B. No. 151, #1-CC-1753 (ALJ decision Mar. 16, 1981).
In other instances, an ostensibly political protest against a foreign government's
policy may have a significant relation to the strikers' economic self interest. For example,
longshoremen have boycotted Egyptian ships to protest an Egyptian governmental policy which
affected the longshoremen's job opportunities. See Khedivial Line v. Seafarers' Union, 278 F.2d
49, 51 (2d Cir. 1960).
" See notes 68-70 supra.
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might qualify strikers for section 7 protection, 78 but probably would fail for
purposes of showing a Norris-LaGuardia "labor dispute. " 79
An interesting category of strikes over matters beyond an employer's ap-
parent control occurs when strikers are protesting the conduct of their own
union. This kind of strike probably does not arise with great frequency. Most
"wildcat" strikes are over arbitrable disputes with management concerning
the workers' immediate work conditions. Such strikes clearly are enjoinable, as
the employees are bound by the no-strike clause in their collectively bargained
agreement. 8° Where the impetus for a wildcat strike is disgruntlement over a
union's policy or performance, however, post -Buffalo Forge cases have denied
requests for injunctive relief against the striking employees.'"
These cases typically have arisen during negotiations over prospective
contract terms. In this situation, even if the worker upset were directed at
management, the dispute ordinarily would not be arbitrable. Where the
dispute does not arise during contract negotiations, it is necesary to determine
whether the walkout really is "over" an internal union problem, or instead is
aimed at a goal or relief within management's control. Depending on the
language of the applicable agreement, if the dispute concerns a matter within
the employer's control, the grievance may be arbitrable. 82 If a wildcat walkout
merely protests a union's substantive position in a dispute with management
over work conditions, however, the underlying worker dispute is with the
union and is non-arbitrable." Because the dispute is not arbitrable, the strike is
not enjoinable under section 301, even though concerted employee activity in-
consistent with the position of its union generally is unprotected and is subject
78 See, e.g., NLRB v. Gould, 638 F.2d 159, 163 (10th Cir. 1980).
79 See cases cited in note 70 supra; Allied Int'l v. ILA, 492 F. Supp. 334, 337-38 (D.
Mass. 1980), 640 F.2d 1368 (1st Cir. 1981).
80 International Detective Serv. v. Local 251 Teamsters, 614 F.2d 29, 31.32 (1st Cir.
1980); F. J. Schindler v. Local 274, 93 L.R.R.M. 3085, 3085-86 (E.D. Pa. 1976). Damages
against individual strikers have not been allowed. See Complete Auto Transit v. Reis, 451 U.S.
401, 405-17 (1981); Westinghouse Elec. v. IUE, 470 F. Supp. 1298, 1299 (W.D. Pa. 1979), ap-
peal dismissed, 614 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1980).
Al See Complete Auto Transit v. Reis, 614 F.2d 1110, 1114 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 451
U.S. 401 (1981) ("so long as the employees refused to work because of dissatisfaction with the
representation given by their union, the strike was not enjoinable"); Automobile Transport, Inc.
v. Ferdnance, 420 F. Supp. 75 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
In Complete Auto Transit, the court enjoined the strike when it determined that the pur-
pose of the strike was to settle the arbitrable issue of amnesty for the wildcat strikers. 614 F.2d at
1114. All parties there agreed that the amnesty issue was arbitrable. The Supreme Court, in ad-
dressing the issue of damages in Complete Auto Transit, did not express any opinion on the ap-
propriateness of the injunctive relief. 451 U.S. at 416-17 n.18.
82 See Suburban Transit v. NLRB, 536 F.2d 1018, 1019 (3d Cir. 1976), where dissident
employees objected to the employer's signing of a contract with one of two competing unions.
The underlying dispute was deemed to be arbitrable even though the striking workers were ob-
jecting to representation by the union then in control of the grievance-arbitration machinery. Id.
at 1022. See also Bethlehem Mines v. UMW, 340 F. Supp. 829, 834 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
" See cases cited in note 81 supra.
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to both union and employer discipline." The strike is a "labor dispute" under
the Norris-LaGuardia Act because the economic self-interest of the strikers is
implicated even if the union's position is beyond the employer's control." If
the object of the strike is to extract a concession from management concerning
a matter that is arbitrable, however, the walkout subverts arbitration and
should be enjoinable. Subtle questions of fact are likely to be presented in this
context, as courts try to discern whether a strike is prompted merely by worker
dissatisfaction with their union, or is an attempt to extract management con-
cessions on an arbitrable issue.
It is arguable that employee wildcat strikes, especially those in support of a
position antithetical to that of the union's, generally ought to be enjoinable. By
undermining the authority of the union, such strikes tend to undermine the
whole collective bargaining structure on which arbitration is based. 86 The
question is whether such wildcat strikes in breach of a no-strike clause suffi-
ciently erode the federal pro-arbitration policy as to be enjoinable under Buffalo
Forge's accomodation of section 301 and the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Under cur-
rent authority, a section 301 injunction may issue only when the wildcat strike
is precipitated by an arbitrable dispute with management, or when the under-
lying dispute is so unrelated to the strikers' interests that no "labor dispute" is
presented."
B. Exclusions from Arbitration and/or No-Strike Clauses
Boys Markets established two threshold requirements for a section 301 in-
junction to issue: the breach of a no-strike clause and the presence of an ar-
bitrable underlying grievance." Many collective bargaining agreements,
however, either exclude certain matters from arbitration, or create exceptions
to a union's no-strike obligation. 89 Where the underlying dispute has been ex-
" 4 That the strike is unprotected under § 7 of the NLRA does not mean that it is un-
protected under Norris-LaGuardia Act. See Scott v. Moore, 640 F.2d 708, 713-14 (5th Cir.
1981).
Concerning the § 7 status of wildcat activity, see generally Cantor, Dissident Worker Ac-
tion after the Emporium, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 35 (1975). One of the ironies of Buffalo Forge is that it
creates an incentive for an employer to use self-help discipline against striking workers where in-
junctive relief is not available. But cf. United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 530 F.2d 266 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976) (circuit court criticized use of self-help as alternative to arbitration).
85 See Barnes & Tucker Co. v. UMW, 338 F. Supp. 924, 926-27 (W.D. Pa. 1972); cf.
Bodecker v. Local P-46, 640 F.2d 182, 185 (8th Cir. 1981).
86 Contra, Axelrod, The Application of the Boys Markets Decision in the Federal Courts, 16
B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 893, 928-29 (1975).
87 See cases cited in note 81 supra.
88 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 253-55. See Mohawk
Rubber Co. v. United Rubber Workers, 462 F. Supp. 993, 995 (N.D. Ohio 1978). A no-strike
obligation sometimes may be implied from a broad arbitration clause. Gateway Coal Co. v.
UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 381-82 (1974).
89 See generally Axelrod, supra note 86. An agreement might provide that a union's no-
strike pledge does not apply where: employees are confronted with a primary picket line; the
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eluded from arbitration or is not subject to the no-strike pledge, the resultant
strike may not be enjoined under section 301. Although this principle is easily
stated, the Court's admonition in Buffalo Forge that the lower courts should not
usurp the functions of arbitrators has created difficulty in its application. Im-
portant questions have arisen concerning the proper role of the court where a
union defends a suit for injunctive relief by arguing that the underlying dispute
really is not arbitrable, or that the particular job action falls within a contrac-
tual exception to the no-strike clause. The scope of a no-strike clause and even
the scope of an arbitration clause ultimately may be arbitrable issues. 9° The
question is whether a court must defer to an arbitrator on these issues and
withhold injunctive relief pending arbitration.
Prior to Buffalo Forge, courts assumed that the broad presumption of ar-
bitrability first articulated in the Steelworker's trilogy extended to section 301 in-
junction cases. 91 Indeed, the Supreme Court appeared to endorse this assump-
tion in Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW. 92 In Gateway Coal, the Court upheld a section
301 injunction against striking coal miners despite the union's contention that
the strike was permissible under an arbitration clause exception." After Buffalo
Forge, however, the broad presumption of arbitrability would not appear ap-
plicable to actions to enjoin strikes in alleged violation of a no-strike pledge.
This conclusion finds support in the Buffalo Forge Court's insistence that the
underlying dispute must in fact be arbitrable in order for a Boys Markets injunc-
tion to issue." Faithfulness to Buffalo Forge would appear to require the courts
themselves to make a careful inquiry into the arbitrability of a dispute, as well
as into whether a no-strike clause has been breached.
Courts have not universally subscribed to this view, however. Cases
decided under section 301 since Buffalo Forge have exhibited divergent
responses where unions have claimed either that the underlying dispute was
within an exclusion to an arbitration clause or that the job action was within an
exception to a no-strike clause. A few courts have seemed willing to make a
fairly searching examination of the merits of the union's asserted defense."
employer does not cooperate in arbitration proceedings; the employer does not comply with an
arbitration award; or the employer does not adhere to "wage rate" strikes over "local" as opposed
to national issues under an industry-wide agreement. Set, e.g., Aluminum Co. v. UAW, 630
F.2d 1340, 1342 (9th Cir. 1980); Automobile Transport, Inc. v. Ferdnance, 420 F. Supp. 75, 77
(E.D. Mich. 1976). Sometimes a contract will exclude a particular matter from both an arbitra-
tion obligation and a no-strike obligation. See Waller Brothers Stone Co. v. United Steelworkers,
Dist. 23, 620 F.2d 132, 134 (6th Cir. 1980).
°° See Long-Airdox Co. v. UAW Local 772, 622 F.2d 70, 71 (4th Cir. 1980).
91 See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. CWA, 454 F.2d 1333, 1336-37 (5th
Cir. 1971). See also Standard Food Prods. Corp. v. Brandenburg, 436 F.2d 964, 966 (2d Cir.
1970). But see Note, Labor Injunctions, Boys Markets, and the Presumption of Arbitrability, 85 HARv.
L. REV. 636 (1972) (criticizing the extension of the presumption of arbitrability to § 301 injunc-
tion cases).
92 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
" Id. at 385. Gateway Coal's endorsement of a presumption of arbitrability appears to
have been dictum, however, as the opinion also approved a lower court finding that the safety ex-
ception to an arbitration clause had not been properly invoked by the union. See Cantor, supra
note 4, at 258, 276-78.
94 428 U.S. at 410 (1975).
"See Trans Int'l Airlines v. Teamsters, 650 F.2d 949, 959-61 (9th Cir. 1980); Burke v.
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These courts reject any presumption that the underlying dispute is arbitrable
and make a preliminary assessment of the issue themselves. Other courts have
reacted to the admonition in Buffalo Forge not to usurp the function of ar-
bitrators by declining to issue a no-strike injunction where the union has raised
a colorable defense to its ostensible breach of arbitration and no-strike
pledges . 96
A recent Sixth Circuit case, Waller Brothers Stone Co. v. United Steelworkers
District 23, 97 illustrates this approach. In that case, the collective bargaining
agreement provided that the union could strike over, and was not required to
arbitrate, disputes concerning certain "wages rates."" When the employer in-
stalled a new machine to assist employees classified as "craters," the union in-
sisted on an adjustment to the craters' wages." The union struck over the issue
when their demands were not met.'" In seeking an injunction against the
strike, the employer maintained that the craters' job classification included the
operation of the new machine, and that the "wage rates" exception to the no-
strike clause applied only to certain unsettled job classifications.'°' If the
underlying dispute were thus characterized as one over the scope of a job
classification, the dispute would be arbitrable and an injunction normally
would be available. Conversely, if the dispute was considered one over "wage
rates" within the meaning of the no-strike exclusion, an injunction would be
barred. The court declined to determine which of these competing interpreta-
tions of the underlying dispute was correct, treating the issue as one principally
for an arbitrator."' Based on this reasoning, the court refused to authorize an
injunction against the strike pending arbitration.'" In support of its holding,
the court cited the passage in Buffalo Forge which discussed the importance of
not usurping the functions of arbitrators.'"
The Waller Brothers approach apparently would require a no-strike injunc-
Nasland Eng'g, 95 L.R.R.M. 2606 (C.D. Calif. 1977). Cf. Local 13, Professional & Technical
Eng'rs v. General Elec. Co., 531 F.2d 1178, 1184-85 (3d Cir. 1976) (where court carefully con-
sidered a contractual exclusion from arbitration in context of a union suit to enjoin employer On-
duct).
96 Layne-Wester Co. v. IVOE Local 513, 650 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir. 1981); Matson
Plastering v. Operative Plasterers, 633 F.2d 1307, 1309 (9th Cir. 1980); Waller Brothers Stone
Co. v. United Steelworkers Dist. 23, 620 F.2d 132, 135-37 (6th Cir. 1980); see Design &
Manufacturing Corp. v. UAW, 608 F.2d 767, 769-70 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938
(1980); Coordinating Committee Steel Cos. v. United Steelworkers, 436 F. Supp. 208, 213.17
(W.D. Pa. 1977).
97 620 F.2d 132 (6th Cir. 1980).
98 Id. at 134.
99 Id. at 133.
1 " Id.
Id. at 134.
IO2 Id. at 137.
105 Id. at 137. The Waller Brothers court admonished that an injunction "should not issue
unless it clearly appears to the trial judge that the dispute which underlies the strike is subject to a
no-strike obligation." Id. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit recently has ruled: "where it is not clear
that the strike is over an arbitrable issue and is in violation of a no-strike clause, the district court
has no jurisdiction to enjoin strike activity pending the arbitrator's decision." Matson Plastering
Co. v. Operative Plasterers, 633 F.2d 1307, 1309 (9th Cir. 1980).
101 Waller Brothers Stone Co. v. United Steelworkers Dist. 23, 620 F.2d at 137. See also
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tion to be denied whenever a union raised a colorable claim that the underlying
dispute was excluded from arbitration, or that an exception to a no-strike
obligation was present. Under this approach, courts would eschew a full-blown
examination of the merits of a union's defense, in order to avoid invading the
domain of arbitrators. It is submitted, however, that although this approach is
consistent with one theme of Boys Markets and Buffalo Forge, it fails to effectuate
the dominant purposes of those decisions. Under the Waller Brothers approach,
the refusal to enjoin a strike pending an arbitrator's ruling on arbitrability
and/or the scope of a no-strike exception might have the ironic effect of mooting
or undermining arbitration. The continued pressure of the strike could extract
employer concessions on issues which may be within the scope of the arbitra-
tion clause and the no-strike pledge. Such coerced resolution of arbitrable
disputes was the very evil which Boys Markets sought to remedy by authorizing
section 301 injunctions.' 05
More importantly, a preliminary judicial assessment of arbitrability, or of
the scope of a no-strike pledge, is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
apparent view of the proper judicial-arbitral division of responsibility in inter-
preting labor contracts. The Boys Markets Court, in establishing requirements
for a section 301 injunction — including breach of a no-strike clause and
presence of an arbitrable underlying grievance — must have anticipated some
judicial role in these determinations despite potential overlap with arbitral
functions. i°6
 Indeed, if injunctions ever are to issue under section 301, the
courts must take an active role in interpreting the scope of no-strike pledges.
Colorable defenses can be constructed in almost any no-strike injunction pro-
ceeding. For example, even in the absence of contractual language creating ex-
ceptions to an arbitration clause or a no-strike pledge, a union might maintain
that its job action really is not a "strike,' 107
 or that the strike actually is
"over" a dispute other than the arbitrable one ostensibly at hand.'°8 These
Mohawk Rubber Co. v. United Rubber Workers, 462 F. Supp. at 1001 (emphasizing judicial
respect for the arbitrator's role in assessing the scope of an exception to a no-strike obligation).
185 See text and note at note 8 supra.
um Some judicial-arbitral duplication of effort is inevitable. Cf. Trans. Int'l Airliners v.
Teamsters, 650 F.2d 949, 966 n. 12 (9th Cir. 1981) (a case arising under the Railway Labor
Act). Even after a Boys Markets injunction has been issued, an arbitrator still could find that the
underlying dispute was not arbitrable, or that the strike did not violate a no-strike clause. See
note 109 infra.
In Jacksonville Maritime Ass'n v. ILA, 571 F.2d 319, 323-24 (5th Cir. 1978), the
court considered whether a concerted refusal to obey certain management instructions con-
stituted a strike within the meaning of a no-strike clause. Even though this issue was arbitrable,
the court made a preliminary assessment for purposes of ruling on a request for a 301 injunc-
tion. The court noted that its independent findings on the issue inevitably would result in some
overlap with the roles of arbitrators. Id. at 325. In American Ship Building Co. v. Local 358,
Bhd. of Boilermakers, 459 F. Supp. 491, 494 (N.D. Ohio 1978), the court also determined
whether a refusal to work overtime constituted a strike under the contract. See also Foam &
Plastics Div., Tenneco Chemicals, Inc. v. Teamsters, 520 F.2d 945, 947-48 (3d Cir. 1975). But
see Molded Materials Co. v. IUE, 418 F. Supp. 548, 550 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
' 88 Striking miners, for example, sometimes have asserted that a particular walkout real-
ly is over prior judicial meddling in labor affairs, not over management conduct. See Cedar Coal
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defenses ought to be judicially assessed at the outset even though they ultimate-
ly may constitute arbitrable issues. Under the scheme contemplated by Boys
Markets, the court should make preliminary findings on issues prerequisite to
an injunction, even though the arbitrator may subsequently reconsider these
issues. 1 °9 Under this procedure, the merits of the underlying arbitrable dispute
ultimately will be determined by the arbitrator. This approach is superior to
the Waller Brothers approach because it better effectuates the congressional
policy of encouraging arbitration, without flouting the division of functions
between courts and arbitrators contemplated by Boys Markets and Buffalo Forge.
Contract rights would be more fully and accurately enforced if courts were
to make the preliminary determination whether the underlying dispute is ar-
bitrable and whether the no-strike clause has been breached. This procedure
would avoid the hazard encountered in pre-Buffalo Forge cases of employing a
broad presumption of arbitrability to issue preliminary injunctions, while effec-
tively relegating union defenses to arbitration. "° Active judicial determination
of preliminary issues would also avoid the Waller Brothers hazard of permitting
strikes to continue despite the apparent violation of a no-strike clause. Under
the propose procedure, union contentions that a dispute is non-arbitrable, or
that an exception to the no-strike obligation applies, would be evaluated by the
court before an injunction would issue. If an injunction were to issue, an ar-
bitrator could reconsider these preliminary questions before addressing the
merits of the underlying dispute. For example, in a hypothetical situation with
facts like those in Waller Brothers, an arbitrator would consider first whether a
court had found correctly that the underlying dispute was over job classifica-
tion and therefore was arbitrable. If the arbitrator concurred with the finding of
the court, he or she then would consider whether the employer had correctly
defined the job classification in issue.
This division of responsibilities between arbitrators and the courts is en-
tirely consistent with the thrust of Boys Markets and Buffalo Forge: encouraging
the peaceful resolution of labor disputes through arbitration. The Buffalo Forge
Court's warning not to usurp the functions of arbitrators came in a context in
Co. v. UMW, 560 F.2d 1153, 1159, 1171 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1047 (1978);
Peabody Coal Co. v. UMW, 430 F. Supp. 205, 207 n.4 (E.D. Mo. 1977). See also National Re-
jectors Indus. v. United Steelworkers, 562 F.2d 1069, 1076-77 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 923 (1978); Long-Airdox Co. v. UAW Local 772, 622 F.2d 70, 71-72 (4th Cir. 1980);
American Ship Building Co. v. Local 358, Bhd. of Boilermakers, 459 F. Supp. 491, 495 (N.D.
Ohio 1978) for other examples of union claims that a strike really was over a dispute other than
the one which had appeared to have precipated the walkout.
109 It has long been understood that arbitrability is a threshold determination for a court
even though the issue may be reexamined by an arbitrator. See, e.g., New Orleans Steamship
Ass'n v. ILA, 626 F.2d 455, 467 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981).
"°See Axelrod, supra note 86 at 914-32 and cases cited therein. Before Buffalo Forge, many
courts issued 301 injunctions without carefully considering a union's defense that its strike fell
under an exception to an arbitration or no-strike clause. The defense was left to an arbitrator's
subsequent determination. This approach created the potential for "erroneous" interim injunc-
tions where an arbitrator subsequently sustained the union's defense. Yet the Court in Gateway
Coal Co. arguably provided some support for this position by applying the presumption of ar-
bitrability in a no-strike injunction context. See text and notes at notes 92-93 supra.
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which a single issue, the naked contractual breach of a no-strike clause, con-
fronted both the court and an arbitrator.'" The issue facing the court was con-
gruent with the issue to be submitted to an arbitrator. This left the arbitrator
with no completely independent task. The Buffalo Forge facts were unlike the
more customary Boys Markets situation involving a strike over an arbitrable
grievance. In this more typical case, certain preliminary issues, such as ar-
bitrability, may be subject to both judicial and arbitral scrutiny, but the
underlying grievance is reserved for determination by an arbitrator. 112
 Thus,
as long as there is an underlying arbitrable dispute, the court considering an in-
junction will be leaving an arbitrator an opportunity to function independent-
ly.
Moreover, the language in Buffalo Forge concerning the danger of court
usurping the functions of arbitrators merely reinforced the Court's basic posi-
tion that a section 301 no-strike injunction should issue only in order to enforce
a union's arbitration pledge. Thus, the admonition in Buffalo Forge to preserve
arbitrators' roles cannot be considered in isolation. To do so risks eviscerating
Boys Markets by deferring preliminary judicial determinations to arbitration and
forestalling all interim injunctive relief. The Buffalo Forge Court feared
wholesale judicial involvement in the interpretation of labor contracts if every
allegation of a naked breach of contract were subject to judicial resolution via
suit for an injunction."' By noting this danger, however, the Court did not
direct courts to avoid all preliminary issues merely beacuse such issues might
be subject to reconsideration by an arbitrator. The thrust of Boys Markets —
which survives Buffalo Forge — was to allow labor injunctions in order to pre-
vent preemption of arbitration through strike-induced settlements of arbitrable
disputes.
The approach advocated here — careful judicial assessment of
preliminary issues such as arbitrability of the underlying dispute — will
sometimes result in withholding injunctive relief pending arbitration. This
result obtains both because some underlying disputes will be found to be non-
arbitrable, and because judicial non-intervention pending arbitration may
sometimes be found to be part of the remedial scheme for contract breach as
contemplated by the parties to the collective bargaining agreement. 14 The par-
"' 428 U.S. at 410-11.
"2
 Sometimes the preliminary issues in an injunction proceeding will be closely related
to the underlying arbitrable issues, as in Waller Brothers, 620 F.2d 132 (6th Cir. 1980), where an
exception to a no-strike clause was tied to a substantive violation of the contract. And an ar-
bitrator will inevitably be influenced to some degree by the prior judicial expressions in the court
proceeding. Nonetheless, an arbitrator is clearly not bound by the preliminary judicial findings
either in reassessing the preliminary question such as arbitrability, or in deciding the underlying
issues of substantive contract violations. See notes 106, 107 and 109 supra. As noted, some degree
of judicial-arbitral overlap was inevitable under the Boys Markets framework, and simply cannot
be avoided if 301 injunctions are to continue to be available. The approach suggested here does
no more than to allow an injunction where a court determines that a no-strike clause was violated
in a dispute over an arbitrable grievance — a result consistent with that in Boys Markets.
'" 428 U.S. at 410-11.
1 " See note 33 supra for elaboration of this contractual intent approach.
May 1982]	 NON-ARBITRABLE DISPUTES 	 659
ties may intend to forego resort to injunctive relief pending an arbitrator's deter-
mination of whether a no-strike clause has been breached. For example, the
parties may intend a right of first interpretation, or a privilege of first breach,
in one party subject to the other party's recourse to arbitral relief as provided in
the collective bargaining agreement."' This intent may be evidenced by the
terms of the agreement or by the parties' understandings about their customary
prerogatives. In Waller Brothers, the agreement explicitly provided an exception
to a no-strike pledge. Such a provision might indicate an intent to give the
union a privilege of first interpretation of this language within the no-strike
clause. Where the union has been granted a privilege of first interpretation,
and the bargaining agreement requires the arbitration of disputes, the
employer must acquiesce in the union's interpretation of the exception to the
no-strike clause pending arbitration of the issue. 16 This analysis does not sug-
gest that employers always would be barred from preliminary injunctive relief
if an agreement contains an exception to a no-strike pledge. The issue is one of
contractual intent. Contractual language or bargaining history may
demonstrate that the exception to the no-strike pledge was not intended to con-
fer upon the union a piivilege of first interpretation.
One way for employers to avoid confusion over whether a union has been
granted a right of first interpretation is to bargain for an explicit status quo
pledge by the union. A status quo pledge is a promise to maintain the status
quo pending arbitral resoluton of whether the conditions to the exception in the
no-strike clause have been met."' Such a promise would demonstrate that the
union had not reserved any prerogative of first interpretation of the scope of a
no-strike pledge.
" 5 This analysis would most commonly apply where an employer invoked its traditional
prerogative to manage its enterprise, subject to union recourse to contract enforcement
machinery. See Cantor, supra note 4, at 266-68. The analysis is eqally applicable, however, to a
union's initiation of a strike pursuant to an explicit contractual exception to the no-strike clause.
" 6 In Design & Mfg. Corp. v. UAW, 608 F.2d 767, 768 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 938 (1980), the union had reserved the right to engage in a sympathy strike if the company
shifted production from a strikebound unit within the company and that unit's employees were
picketing to protest the performance of struck work. The union contended that a shift in produc-
tion had in fact occurred and that its sympathy strike was permitted under the contract. The
employer contended that the alleged shift in production constituted an underlying arbitrable
dispute warranting a no-strike injunction pending arbitration. The court denied the employer's
application for an injunction, finding simply that the sympathy strike was not over an arbitrable
grievance, and that whether a shift in production had occurred was an issue which would be
resolved by arbitration of whether the no-strike clause had been breached.
" 7 Of. Coordinating Committee Steel Cos. v. United Steelworkers, 436 F. Supp. 208,
216 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (court commented on the absence of contractual language providing
responsibility for arbitration of the no-strike clause's exception for "local issues." In other
words, the court sought guidance whether the union had been given a privilege to interpret
"local issues," subject only to arbitration, or whether the court could interpret the language itself
in the context of an employer request of a no-strike injunction. Of course, a mere statement that
the meaning of the no-strike clause's exception is subject to arbitration would not permit injunc-
tive relief. As Buffalo Forge illustrated, the scope of a no-strike clause is not an underlying ar-
bitrable grievance for purposes of a Boys Markets injunction. See also Design & Mfg. Corp. v.
UAW, supra note 116. Consequently, before issuing an injunction, a court must find that the
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C. Changes in Contract Terms
Generally, the establishment of new, prospective terms to a collective
bargining agreement is not an arbitrable matter." 8 Consequently, a union
which is intent on avoiding an injunction, but which is willing to risk
disciplinary action against its members or damages against itself, might admit
that its strike object is inconsistent with current contract terms and that a
change in terms is being sought. Although the union's strike may violate its no-
strike pledge, 19
 may be unprotected against employer discipline,' 20 and may
even be an unfair labor practice,'" it arguably is not "over" an arbitrable
grievance. Therefore, under Buffalo Forge, the strike might be immune from a
section 301 injunction. Some courts have adopted this line of reasoning.'"
Although this reasoning is techinically consistent with Buffalo Forge, it
nevertheless would result in unwarranted restrictions on the availability of Boys
Markets injunctions. In order to avoid an injunction, a union would need only
to assert that its substantive goal was inconsistent with current contract terms.
This result elevates form over substance. Under a better approach, such self-
serving declarations should not be accepted at face value. If there is a colorable
claim that the contract already grants the asserted object to the union, then the
dispute concerns the meaning of the existing collective bargaining
agreement.' 23
 Such disputes clearly are arbitrable. When the dispute may
union agreed not to strike pending arbitration of the scope of the exception, or that the union has
not reserved a privilege of first interpretation and that the particular dispute does not fall within
the exception to the no-strike pledge.
18 Most collective bargaining agreements confine arbitration to disputes over the con-
tractual obligations currently in force and do not include an "interest arbitration" provision.
Many agreements, however, do purport to apply to all disputes between the parties which arise
during the term of the agreement. Under such broad arbitration clauses, a dispute over an at-
tempt to alter an existing contract term should be arbitrable.
19 Depending on how the contractual language is construed, a no-strike pledge may be
deemed to include strikes over non-arbitrable grievances. Compare New Orleans Steamship Ass'n
v. ILA, 626 F.2d 455, 468 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. granted. 450 U.S. 1029 (1981), and cases cited in
note 44 supra, with Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Teamsters, Local 326, 624 F.2d 1182,
1185-86 (8th Cir. 1980).
120 See Automobile Transport, Inc. v. Ferdnance, 420 F. Supp. 75, 78 (E.D. Mich,
1976).
121 See Le Roy Machinery, 147 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1964). A union may not unilaterally
seek to alter a contract provision during the term of the agreement where the reopening of a
bargained issue is not permitted by the agreement. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1220
(1951), aff'd 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952). Such action is a 8(b)(3) unfair labor practice and is
protentially enjoinable under S 10(j).
122 For lower court decisions supporting this position, see Automobile Transport, Inc.
v.Ferdnance, 420 F. Supp. 75, 77 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Coordinating Committee Steel Cos. v.
United Steelworkers, 436 F. Supp. 208, 215 (W.D. Pa. 1977). In Coordinating Committee, the local
workers had struck over certain incentive pay provisions which the court found had not yet been
incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement. Because the court regarded the strike as
one over "new rights in future contracts," it refused to issue an injunction despite finding a clear
breach of the no-strike clause and irreparable injury to the employer. Id. at 214-16.
123 See Mohawk Rubber Co. v. United Rubber Workers, 462 F. Supp. 993, 999-1000
(N.D. Ohio 1978).
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properly be characterized in this fashion, a no-strike injunction pending ar-
bitration would be within Boys Markets ) 24
In cases where the union's object clearly is inconsistent with the existing
contract, injunctive relief still may be available to prevent a breach of the no-
strike clause. Some arbitration clauses cover "all disputes between the
parties," and not merely disputes over the interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement. Where the agreement contains this kind of clause, an
injunction against a strike seeking contract modification would seem permis-
sible.' 25 Even under the more typical arbitration clause covering "all disputes
over the meaning or application of" the agreement, strikes in pursuit of a pur-
ported contract change usually should be treated as arbitrable matters for pur-
poses of section 301. If a union strikes for $5.10 per hour and the wage clause in
its contract calls for $5.00 per hour, the union should not to be able to avoid an
injunction by the expediency of admitting that it has no contractual entitlement
to the extra 10 cents per hour. The union in this circumstance has effectively
obligated itself to use grievance-arbitration to resolve all possible disputes over
the subject of wages for the term of the collective bargaining agreement. 126 It
would be anomalous if a union was immune from a no-strike injunction when
its claim clearly was incompatible with the current contract, but the union
could be enjoined when it had a colorable contract claim, or even a frivolous
claim which it had pressed to arbitration and lost.'" While not every substan-
tive objective of the union is arbitrable, a court should be reluctant to treat a
substantive claim as being beyond an arbitrator's domain where the union is
124
 If an arbitrator then ruled that the union's substantive goal was indeed inconsistent
with the contract, this ruling would not permit the union to assert that similar claims in the future
were non-arbitrable and hence non-enjoinable. A subsequent strike to secure the same union
goal might well be enjoinable in furtherance of the initial arbitration award. See Campbell's '66
Express v. Rundel, 597 F.2d 125, 128-30 (8th Cir. 1979).
1 " If this analysis is correct, employers will have a strong incentive to bargain for the
broadest possible arbitration provision.
126 Unless the union can establish that the subject matter of its claim has been excluded
from arbitration, the union can be deemed to have submitted all disputes about contractually
covered matters to an arbitrator — no matter how frivolous the union's claim may seem under
the current contract language, A vast array of superficially wrong or worthless claims are subject
to arbitration. Indeed, some seemingly farfetched claims will be upheld in arbitration, as contrac-
tual language is customarily broad and flexible, subject to arbitral interpretation. For example,
even without explicit contractual language constraining an employer's proposed action, a union
can oppose the proposed action by contending that the action is inconsistent with general contrac-
tual provisions such as seniority or job classification clauses, or with implied terms flowing from
past practices or bargaining history, or with implied requirements of "fair dealing" and the like.
See Aluminum Co. v. UAW, 630 F.2d 1340, 1343-44 (9th Cir. 1980); Meat Cutters' Local 494 v.
Rosauer's Super Markets, 29 Wash. App. 150, 627 F.2d 1330, petition for review denied, 96
Wash. 2d 1002, (1981). Arbitrators are expected to use the "common law of the shop" to fill the
gaps left by vague and incomplete contract language. Id.; United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation, 363 U.S. 574 (1960). In short, a strike in pursuit of a purported contract change
should ordinarily be treated as an avoidance of arbitration for purposes of S 301 policy.
' 27 But see Trans Int'l Airlines, Inc. v, Teamsters, 650 F.2d 949, 964 (9th Cir. 1981) (ex-
pressing a willingness to accept such an anomaly).
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seeking to evade both its no-strike pledge and the substantive terms of the ex-
isting agreements.
There is an additional reason why a strike avowedly seeking a contract
change during the course of a collective bargaining agreement may be en-
joinable. In many instances, management may have retained control of a
disputed matter pursuant to a broad management prerogative clause in the col-
lective bargaining agreement. By agreeing to such a clause, the union may
waive its right to bargain over the matter during the term of the collective
bargaining agreement. To use economic action to try and compel bargaining
on such a matter is inconsistent with the bargained waiver. Thus, a strike to ex-
tract a contract change concerning the matter in question is not only a likely
breach of the union's no-strike clause, but also might constitute an unfair labor
practice under section 8(b)(3) of the NLRA governing union collective
bargaining obligations.' 28
 Accordingly, the strike could be enjoined pursuant
to section 10(j) of the NLRA. If the strike is an unfair labor practice, then
arguably it is also "unlawful" within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. This would mean that a section 301 injunction to prevent the breach of a
no-strike clause would not be barred by the Norris-LaGuardia Act' 28
 even if
the contract change were deemed non-arbitrable.
Although this line of analysis is plausible, it may not guarantee injunctive
relief. A union's job action is not necessarily unlawful under the Norris-
LaGuardia Act merely because it violates some statutory provision.'"
Moreover, a claim under section 8(b)(3) may be subject to the exclusive
primary jurisdiction of the NLRB and its enforcement machinery."'
Therefore, a preferable analytic framework would be to treat a strike seeking a
change in the terms of a collective bargaining agreement as an arbitrable mat-
ter under the customary clause requiring arbitration of any dispute over the
"meaning or application" of the agreement.
18 See cases cited in note 121 supra.
129
 Section 7 of Norris-LaGuardia authorizes an injunction in a labor dispute where
"unlawful" conduct is threatened. Scott v. Moore, 640 F.2d 708, 713-14 (6th Cir. 1981). Cf.
Orders of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 362 U.S. 330, 360-62 (Whittaker, J.,
dissenting) (a Railway Labor Act case). The presence of statutory violations has been used, in
other instances, to support a finding of unlawfulness under Norris-LaGuardia and thus to permit
injunctive relief. See Summit Airlines v. Teamsters Local 295, 628 F.2d 787, 795 (2d Cir. 1980);
McGuire Shaft v. Tunnel Corp. Local 1791, UMW, 475 F.2d 1209, 1214-15 (Emerg. Ct.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 958 (1973). This is so even though the unlawfulness exception to Norris-
LaGuardia might well have been intended to apply only to labor violence.
"3° See Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama Steamship Co., 362 U.S. 365, 370-71
(1960); BRT v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649, 655 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 385 U.S. 20
(1966).
"' But see Mullins v. Kaiser Steel, 642 F.2d 1302, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. granted,
101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981), rev'd, 50 U.S.L.W. 4152 (Jan. 13, 1982) ("[W]here a 8(e) defense is
raised by a party which 5 8(e) was designed to protect and where the defense is not directed to a
collateral matter but to the portion of the contract for which enforcement is sought, a court must
entertain the defense. While only the Board may provide affirmative remedies for unfair labor
practices, a court may not enforce a contract provision which violates 5 8(e)."), 50 U.S.L.W. at
4156. It is noteworthy that a district court would be considering the 5 8(b)(3) contention anyway
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CONCLUSION
Although Buffalo Forge established that a no-strike injunction is barred by
the Norris-LaGuardia Act unless the strike is over an arbitrable underlying
grievance, the decision left unresolved basic issues about the continued role of
the courts in section 301 cases. This article has argued that an active judicial
role is consistent with the Supreme Court's directions. Injunctions against
sympathy strikes should be available if a collective bargaining agreement con-
tains a union status quo pledge — a union's promise not to strike pending ar-
bitration of the legality of proposed sympathy strikes. Such clauses should be
enforceable in court. With regard to other strikes over non-arbitrable
grievances, as where the dispute is beyond the scope of the collective bargain-
ing agreement or is excluded by the agreement from arbitration, an injunction
is precluded if the underlying dispute is in fact non-arbitrable. Similarly, an
underlying dispute may fall within an explicit exception to a no-strike clause
and hence be non-enjoinable. However, courts must initially decide whether
the underlying dispute falls within one of these non-enjoinable categories. In
doing so, judges contemplating no-strike injunctions must make initial deter-
minations of some ultimately arbitrable issues. Such initial judicial determina-
tions are not inconsistent with Buffalo Forge's emphasis on preserving the roles
of arbitrators. To the contrary, by enjoining strikes over disputes found to be
arbitrable, courts will promote the peaceful and uncoerced settlement of labor
disputes through arbitration, as favored by both Boys Markets and Buffalo Forge. 132
if the general counsel sought a S 10(j) injunction in federal district court. Consequently, the claim
that a particular no-strike injunction is outside the Norris-LaGuardia Act because the strike is
violative of 5 8(b)(3) and hence unlawful, is not clearly preempted in a 5 301 suit.
132 This article went to press before the decision in Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v.
I.L.A., 50 U.S.L.W. 4789 (June 22, 1982). That case should be consulted particularly with
respect to the Norris-LaGuardia definition of a "labor dispute" discussed supra in text and notes
at notes 65-75.
